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Legalized Rent-Seeking: Eminent 
Domain in Kazakhstan
Margaret Hanson†
Kazakhstan ranks consistently low on measures of property rights 
protection and the rule of law more generally.1 Echoing these evaluations, 
existing literature emphasizes the degree to which informal institutions shape 
property relations in personalist, authoritarian regimes, like Kazakhstan.  The 
expectation is that formal institutions like law and courts fail to restrain or 
otherwise influence state agents’ rent-seeking behavior.  In effect, they serve 
primarily as ornamentation.  Regardless, these explanations fail to explain 
why both citizens and the State regularly turn to these institutions to settle 
property disputes.  This Article focuses on conflicts over eminent domain and 
finds that in these cases the law provides lower and upper bounds for officials’ 
rent-seeking behavior.  Within these limits, law combines with informal 
practices to determine legal outcomes.  Although the law and courts 
sometimes provide citizens with opportunities for limited redress, they also 
help facilitate and legitimize officials’ use of eminent domain for personal 
enrichment.
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Introduction
Do law and courts matter for property rights security in an authoritarian 
regime like Kazakhstan, and if so, how?  There are good reasons to expect it 
† This research was made possible by support from the following: the Social 
Science Research Council’s International Dissertation Research Fellowship, with funds 
provided by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation; IREX Title VIII Individual Advanced 
Research Opportunities program; and the Ohio State University’s Office of International 
Affairs.
1. TERRY MILLER & ANTHONY B. KIM, THE HERITAGE FOUND., INDEX OF ECONOMIC
FREEDOM: PROMOTING ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY AND PROSPERITY 263–64 (2015), 
http://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2015/book/index_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3AQ-
58DW].
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does not.  Like many dictatorships, Kazakhstan fares poorly in cross-national 
evaluations of property rights.  In the Heritage Foundation’s 2015 Rule of 
Law index, an index derived from scores for property rights security and 
corruption, Kazakhstan ranks 140th out of 177 countries.2 Often, local 
executive officials, or akims, drive that insecurity.  As one respondent noted, 
“They try to steal as much as they can before they leave [their post].”3
Eminent domain seizures are a prominent and widespread source of this 
conflict, especially in rapidly-growing urban areas.4 For instance, a woman 
faced with losing her land for minimal compensation repeatedly protested, 
“We’re people, too” (“Biz adammuz”).5 Others lambasted the “injustice,” or 
“nespravedlivost” they endured, railing against a state that “didn’t respect its 
citizens,” or “Gosudarstvo ne uvazhaet grazhdan.”6 Therefore, at first blush, 
we see little evidence that law or courts matter for property rights security.
Indeed, law and social science literature widely accept that property 
rights are generally less secure in authoritarian regimes.7 We tend to think of 
this lax security in terms of breaking the rules: dictators develop laws that 
look good on paper but fail to abide by them.  These formal rules exist solely 
for show.8 Therefore laws lack meaning, and courts serve as mere rubber 
stamps for the autocrat’s wishes.  Dictators are well-known for fabricating 
criminal cases and developing laws to punish or deter opposition.9 In civil 
matters, like property disputes, Hendley argues that courts may serve as 
relatively neutral arbitrators between private parties, but where cases are 
political due to the involvement of government officials, citizens will strive 
to avoid going to court.10 Should officials take them to court, “telephone 
justice,” or “the practice of making an informal command, request, or signal 
in order to influence formal procedures or decision-making” will trump the 
law.11
2. Id.
3. Ethnographic Notes, Neighborhoods/Villages, in S. Kaz. (Feb. 2015)
[hereinafter Ethnographic Notes (S. Kaz.)].
4. Author’s analysis of data available from the Supreme Court of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, http://www.sud.kz/rus/schedule/supervision/civil [https://perma.cc/MN2V-
MLS2] [hereinafter Supreme Court Data]. 
5. Ethnographic Notes, Courts, in Astana, Kaz. (Nov. 2015).
6. Interview with Landholder 9, in Astana, Kaz. (Oct. 2015); Interview with 
Landholder 12, in Astana, Kaz. (Dec. 2015).
7. DEMOCRACY, GOVERNANCE, AND GROWTH 156 (Stephen Knack ed., Univ. Mich.
Press 2003).
8. Howard, A. E. Dick, The Essence of Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AMERICA, POLAND, AND FRANCE 3, 3 (Kenneth W. Thompson & Rett 
T. Ludwikowski eds., 1991).
9. For a review, see Tamir Moustafa, Law and Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, 10
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 281, 281–99 (2014), http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/
full/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-110413-030532 [https://perma.cc/S84X-APYZ].
10. Kathryn Hendley, The Puzzling Non-Consequences of Societal Distrust of Courts: 
Explaining the Use of Russian Courts, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 517, 520–21, 523 (2013).
11. Alena Ledeneva, Telephone Justice in Russia, 24 POST-SOVIET AFF. 324, 326 
(2008), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.2747/1060-586X.24.4.324 [https://
perma.cc/PHC9-DMUB].
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Such informal institutions certainly matter in Kazakhstan and similar 
regimes.  Yet a myopic focus on informality or avoidance provides little 
insight into why Kazakhstan has invested heavily in civil courts and complex 
legal codes, or why citizens purposefully engage state officials in civil courts 
over property disputes.  If law and courts are merely ornaments, why do we 
see both officials and citizens use them regularly?  To address this question, 
I argue that we need a more nuanced approach.  We need to examine how 
they interact with informal institutions, like patron-client relationships.  
Neither can be studied in isolation because, at their core, property rights hinge 
on relationships.  Although this encompasses both relationships among and 
between citizens and the state, the latter is especially crucial in non-
democracies where officials are not directly accountable to constituents.12 In 
these environments, we often equate the rule of law with the degree to which 
formal property rights are followed and enforced.
A crucial assumption often lurks forgotten in the background of these 
evaluations—the idea that property laws are fair or impartial to begin with.  
Consequently, we conflate consistent application of the rules with the 
impartiality of the rules themselves.  In doing so, we can overlook how 
blatantly biased or intentionally contradictory laws regulate property rights.  
I argue that these laws deliberately accommodate multiple logics, both legal 
and informal, which combine in dynamic ways to shape property rights 
security.  Specifically, I find that in Kazakhstan, property and land law 
provide lower and upper bounds on rent-seeking by local officials.  In 
conflicts between state officials and citizens, courts ensure these bounds are 
enforced.  Thus, law and courts matter, but not necessarily for citizens’ 
greater benefit. Since they do matter, however, they sometimes provide 
citizens with opportunities for limited redress from state officials—not an 
equal opportunity, but an opportunity nonetheless.
Because property law and the transaction costs involved in implementing 
these laws vary depending on property type, this Article uses one kind of 
property, land, to develop this argument in depth.  In particular, I focus on 
eminent domain, a government seizure for state needs, or gosnuzhd.
Respondents consistently listed expropriation by state officials as their top 
land rights concern.  Based on court records, this fear appears well-founded.13
Moreover, the issue is highly politicized.  Surprisingly, I find that local 
officials rely on broad legal means when seizing land.14 Furthermore, this 
widespread insecurity does not appear to have slowed development: in the 
capital city, Astana, a booming construction sector accounts for the largest 
proportion of city’s income.15 The same areas plagued by expropriation have 
12. See Thomas Edward Flores, The Political Economy of Property Rights 
Discrimination 57, 62 (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on 
file with the University of Michigan Library).
13. Supreme Court Data, supra note 4.
14. Ethnographic Notes (S. Kaz.), supra note 3.
15. V Astane nabludayetsia rost pokazatelei sotsial’no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiia [In 
Astana, the Rise of Social and Economic Development], LITER (Oct. 24, 2016, 11:33 AM), 
https://liter.kz/mobile/ru/news/show/24971-v_astane_nablyudaetsya_rost_pokazatelei_
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consequently experienced sustained real estate booms and economic 
growth.16 This phenomenon runs counter to widely accepted findings in the 
social sciences that, without secure property rights, economic development 
will be stymied.  Scholars believed that investors would lack confidence that 
they would receive a return on their investment, and would not invest in the 
first place.17 Yet, we have not seen this occur in Kazakhstan.  This suggests 
one of two things: either, in a complete reversal of prevailing understandings, 
property rights security does not impact development, or, property security 
exists, but is not equally distributed among the population.  In short, to 
understand the relationship between property rights, law, and development in 
Kazakhstan, we need to understand what drives the distribution of security.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows.  First, I address some 
key conceptual issues.  Then, I review existing literature on law and courts in 
authoritarian regimes, and the Kazakhstani regime’s investment in these 
formal legal institutions.  Next, I turn specifically to land rights in 
Kazakhstan, and how legislation can shape threats to land rights.  Then I use 
examples from interviews and court cases to demonstrate that law and courts 
shape behavior through dynamic interaction with informal practices.  The last 
section offers conclusions and possible implications for state-society 
relations.  In addition to analyzing legislation relevant to eminent domain, 
these findings draw on fourteen months of fieldwork in three regions of 
Kazakhstan. This fieldwork includes ethnographic observation in civil courts 
and neighborhoods under seizure (pod snosom) and 109 semi-structured 
interviews with attorneys, officials, landholders, and academic experts.
I. A Few Definitions
Before turning to how law and courts matter, some conceptual issues 
need to be addressed.  What do we mean by “rule of law” and “property rights 
security”?  At its most broad, “rule of law” refers to just and fair constraints 
on both state and society; it emphasizes a particular normative outcome: an 
inherently level playing field.18 The World Justice Project’s four-part 
socialno-ekonomicheskogo_razvitiya [https://perma.cc/E9A3-FJA9]; see ORG. FOR SEC.
& COOPERATION IN EUR. [OSCE], KAZAKHSTAN’S IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS OSCE
OBLIGATIONS TO OBSERVE THE HUMAN RIGHT TO A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT 11 (Sept. 25, 
2012), http://www.osce.org/odihr/94158?download=true [https://perma.cc/SSQ8-
YVAZ].
16. Based on ethnographic work in Esilskii and Almatinskii districts, where 
expropriation has occurred, and prices as described. See Rost tsen na zhil’ie v Astane 
Operezhaet Inflatsiu [Housing Prices Rise Faster than Inflation in Astana], FORBES KAZ.
(Feb. 6, 2014), http://forbes.kz/process/property/rost_tsen_na_jile_v_astane_operejaet_
inflyatsiyu/ [https://perma.cc/6S3T-2NFB] [hereinafter Rost tsen]; Ethnographic Notes (S. 
Kaz.), supra note 3.
17. See Stephan Haggard et al., The Rule of Law and Economic Development,
11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 205, 206–21 (2008), http://www.annualreviews.org/
doi/full/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.081205.100244 [https://perma.cc/MZ9R-YX28].
18. See A.B.A. DIVISION FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION, WHAT IS THE RULE OF LAW? 6
(2016), https://www.americanbar.org/“content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features
/Part1DialogueROL.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/DEE6-2NBZ]; JUAN CARLOS 
BOTERO ET AL., WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, WJP RULE OF LAW INDEX 9 (2016), 
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definition provides a good example of this approach:
1. The government and its officials and agents as well as individuals and 
private entities are accountable under the law.
2. The laws are clear, publicized, stable, and just, are applied evenly, and 
protect fundamental rights, including the security of persons and 
property.
3. The process by which the laws are enacted, administered, and enforced is 
accessible, fair, and efficient.
4. Justice is delivered timely by competent, ethical, and independent 
representatives and neutrals who are of sufficient number, have adequate 
resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve.19
Despite this theoretical framework, political scientists and legal scholars 
often conceptualize rule of law more narrowly, by focusing on the degree to 
which laws are actively applied, including to state officials or agents.20  In 
other words, it matters not so much what kinds of rules exist, but rather that 
those rules are adequately and equitably enforced as they are written; formal, 
“parchment” institutions21 should consistently trump their informal 
counterparts.  This view is often inherent in work that advocates greater 
attention to informal institutions.22 Scholars of authoritarianism have drawn 
on this concept in studies of “rule by law,” in which consistent application of 
laws stifles opposition.23 Although the model is based on consistency, the 
scholars tend to focus on criminal laws designed to target acts of resistance 
to the regime or its policies.24 Disputes between officials and non-politically 
involved citizens, especially in more mundane areas of law such as contracts, 
property rights, and taxes, have largely escaped notice.
The above two approaches appear relatively clear-cut in their 
distinctions, but that clarity begins to fade when we examine rule of law in
the specific context of property rights security.  The emphasis has been on 
adequate enforcement of formal law, but equated with the broader definition 
of rule of lawseemingly forgetting that many regimes have an inherent 
interest in maintaining an uneven playing field for property-holders, 
especially vis-a-vis the state.  It is, for example, no accident that many of the 
http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/media/wjp_rule_of_law_index_2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7CCX-K6XT].
19. See BOTERO ET AL., supra note 18. 
20. For further discussion, see Brian Tamanaha, A Concise Guide to the Rule of Law,
in RELOCATING THE RULE OF LAW 3, 5–6 (Gianluigi Palombella & Neil Walker eds., 2009); 
J. Ohnesorge, The Rule of Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 100, 109–10 (2007); see also
John M. Carey, Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions, 33 COMP. POL. STUD. 735, 738–
39 (2000).
21. See Carey, supra note 20, at 736. 
22. See, e.g., Gretchen Helmke & Steven Levitsky, Informal Institutions and 
Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda, PERSPECTIVE  POL. 725, 725 (2004).
23. See RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 14 (Tom 
Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008) [hereinafter RULE BY LAW]. 
24. See, e.g., JOTHIE RAJAH, AUTHORITARIAN RULE OF LAW: LEGISLATION, DISCOURSE 
AND LEGITIMACY IN SINGAPORE 13 (2012).
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world’s most repressive states, including Turkmenistan, Eritrea, and North 
Korea, heavily circumscribe private property rights.25  Doing so allows the 
regime enormous latitude in shaping broader social and economic relations.  
Thus, when scholars define property rights insecurity as “illegal interference 
with any part of the PR [property rights] bundle by governmental or private 
actors,”26 they risk overlooking how regimes can embed insecurity within the 
law itself.  The underlying assumption that they will not stems from 
economics and our understanding that secure property rights facilitate 
economic growth.  Since all regimes strive for economic growth, why would 
any codify insecurity?  It is not necessarily in regimes’ interests to facilitate 
economic growth for all.  Instead, they have every reason to direct it toward 
supporters.27 Lawson-Remer adds to this, finding that it fundamentally 
matters whose property rights are secure as violations of ethnic minorities’ 
property rights do not appear to stymie economic development.28 Legalizing 
property rights insecurity effectively links the strength of property owners’ 
rights to their informal ties with the regime.
At issue here is the kind of property rights insecurity that can be termed 
“legal insecurity.”  Legal insecurity, as used here, refers to violations of the 
legal framework created by property rights law.  This is a very useful, concise 
characterization of what is implied in most work on property rights security.  
As another example, Stuart Banner argues that to make sense of this, it must 
be made clear that in both contemporary law and economics,
property is an abstraction. It refers not to things, material or otherwise, but to rights 
or relationships among people with respect to things. Moreover, the abstraction we 
call property is not monolithic. As suggested by the choice of terms above, it 
consists of a number of disparate legal rights, a ‘bundle’ of them: the right to 
possess, the right to use, the right to exclude, the right to transfer, and so on.29
These legal rights guide who may use and retain benefits (or losses) from a 
particular good, and how such use occurs, and thus create conditions of 
excludability.30  This is the emphasis in Harold Demsetz’s seminal work on 
property rights.31 He states that property rights “specify how persons may be 
25. HERITAGE FOUND., 2016 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM, http://www.heritage.
org/index/explore [https://perma.cc/6SN2-ZN2W] (last visited Nov. 12, 2016). 
26. Stanislav Markus, Secure Property as a Bottom-up Process: Firms, Stakeholders, 
and Predators in Weak States, 64 WORLD POL. 242, 243 (2012). 
27. See Flores, supra note 12, at 8.
28. See Terra Lawson-Remer, Property Insecurity, 38 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 145, 146–
47 (2012).
29. STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF HOW, WHY, AND WHAT 
WE OWN 45 (2011).
30. JESSICA ALLINA-PISANO, THE POST POTEMKIN VILLAGE: THE POLITICS AND 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE BLACK EARTH 175 (2008).
31. His most well-known article on the topic, Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of 
Property Rights, 57 AMER. ECON. REV. 347, 347 (1967), has been cited 8,003 times 
according to Google Scholar.  See Citations of Article, GOOGLE SCHOLAR, https://scholar.
google.com/ [https://perma.cc/A5XC-TCD9] (search article field for “Toward a Theory of 
Property Rights”; then follow “cited by” link) (last visited Mar. 15, 2017).  See generally
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AMER. ECON. REV. 347, 347–
59 (1967).
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benefited and harmed” and provide “guiding incentives to achieve a greater 
internalization of externalities.”32 Thus, this conception of property rights 
security refers to the idea that in a given society, the laws specifying these 
relationships matter concretely for determining how externalities are 
proportioned; insecurity emerges when these laws are broken—hence the 
term, “legal insecurity.”
Though crucial, legal security is only half the story.  Shifts in the 
allocation of property rights can also reduce security, in what can be called 
“allocation insecurity.”  Technically, these are perfectly legal because the 
state itself defines legality through formal rules and legislation.  These 
changes in allocation can be sweeping, as when a new land code is introduced 
or a country redistributes land on a broad scale, but they can also occur within 
the context of existing legislation, at the micro level—that of individuals or 
firms.33 An often myopic focus on private property rights has contributed to 
such changes frequently escaping notice in political economy literature.  
Lease or use rights to land are a key example.34 States cannot only define and 
enforce land rights, but also act as landlords, granting temporary use rights to 
land—i.e., establishing land tenure rights.35 During the lease period, lessees 
may enjoy legal security: their rights as specified by existing law are 
respected and enforced by the state.  But if lessees are not confident of 
conditions surrounding continuation of those rights, they still face 
considerable uncertainty.  Similarly, the right of eminent domain if widely 
exercised, can generate insecurity, that is again, technically legal.  Both this 
“allocation insecurity” along with legal insecurity shorten time horizons and 
increase the risk associated with investment.  In other words, they often have 
a similar impact on economic development as does property rights insecurity.
This distinction is critical when evaluating state strength and rule of law 
in non-democracies, and helps highlight the role that civil law plays in 
authoritarian governance.  Regimes have an inherent interest in securing 
property for supporters rather than making it equally accessible for everyone; 
because property rights are defined by the sovereign, this can be perfectly 
“legal.” In Kazakhstan, this has meant that appointed local executives enjoy 
broad formal legal authority over the allocation of land rights.36 The resulting 
32. See Demsetz, supra note 31, at 347–48.
33. For example, in Kazakhstan, this authority falls to the district (raionu) executive, 
or akimat. ZEMEL’NUI KODEKS RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN [ZK RK] [Land Code of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan)] (2003) (2017) (Kaz.), translated at http://online.zakon.
kz/Document/?doc_id=1040583 [https://perma.cc/2PY8-5JLM] [hereinafter Land Code 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan]. More broadly, see State Ownership of Land, ECONOMY 
WATCH (Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.economywatch.com/agrarian/structure/state-
ownership-land.html [https://perma.cc/8L8R-W9FS] (last visited Jan. 4, 2017).
34. Phillip Keefer, A Review of the Political Economy of Governance: From Property 
Rights to Voice 15 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3315, 2004). 
35. STEPHEN HODGSON, DEVELOPMENT LAW SERVICE, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF U.N.,
LAND AND WATER—THE RIGHTS INTERFACE 10 (2004), http://www.fao.org/3/a-
y5692e.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJ49-6BDM].
36. This includes the authority to determine whether land can be transferred from one 
category of use to another (i.e., from agricultural to residential). See Land Code of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, supra note 33, art. 2.  To set zoning, see id. art. 8(5); to sell land 
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allocation insecurity is largely absent from existing literature on property 
rights security, which emphasizes legal insecurity.  I find that local officials 
in Kazakhstan prefer to operate within the law when engaging in 
expropriation, because doing so allows them to legitimate their actions to 
constituents and superiors.  I argue that in doing so, law establishes guidelines 
for rent-seeking.  As long as officials remain within the law’s bounds, the 
courts, which are faithful agents of the executive, will support them—in 
effect, institutionalizing rent-seeking.  Which legal interpretation governs in 
any given circumstance depends on additional, informal factors, such as 
personal connections, but law still sets the terms.  Backed by informal, patron-
client relationships, law therefore influences whose rights are threatened and 
the manner in which they are threatened.
II. Why Law Shouldn’t Matter
That law and courts influence officials’ behaviors runs counter to how 
we tend to think of their role in authoritarian regimes.  Autocracies depend 
on the informal, subjective application of power to survive. In personalist 
dictatorships, their rule generally rests on a vertically-organized patronage 
network and does not stem from any clear, procedural means of selection, 
such as fair elections.  Without electoral accountability, state officials are 
thought to have few reasons to avoid blatantly violating citizens’ legal rights, 
including their property rights.37 For secure property rights to exist, the state 
must be restrained from predatory behavior that targets constituents.  North 
and Weingast argue that “the development of free markets must be 
accompanied by some credible restrictions on the state’s ability to manipulate 
economic rules to the advantage of itself and its constituents.”38 They find 
that, in Great Britain, it was the existence of a “credible threat” to the state—
the successful dethroning of two kings—that led the British monarchy to tie 
its own hands and stop “future irresponsible behavior” regarding property.39
This required a direct threat enforced by new institutions that facilitated 
monitoring (i.e., regular meetings of Parliament) to ensure that the Crown 
was restrained.40  Authoritarian regimes, especially personalist ones, lack 
“hand-tying” institutions equivalent to Britain’s Parliament.
Kazakhstan certainly falls into this category of personalist, unrestrained 
authoritarian regimes.  Over the past twenty-five years, President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev has steadily consolidated his rule over a power vertical.41
under state ownership, see id. art. 9(3); and to seize land for state needs, see id. arts. 8, 9.
This list is not comprehensive.
37. See James D. Fearon, Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: 
Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performances, in DEMOCRACY,
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION 55, 56 (Adam Przeworski et al. eds., 1999).
38. Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingas, Constitutions and Commitment: The 
Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J.
ECON. HIST. 803, 808 (1989).
39. Id. at 816.
40. Id. at 804, 816.
41. See Corruption Perceptions Index, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (2014),
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Nazarbayev has led the country since it emerged as an independent country 
in 1991, and under his leadership, opposition has been systematically 
marginalized through restrictive electoral laws and criminal prosecution.42 In 
short, the label “rule by law” certainly applies to Kazakhstan,43 and the results 
are predictable.  Nazarbayev received well over 90% of the popular vote in 
the last two presidential elections, and his ruling Nur Otan party dominates 
national and local legislatures.44 The president appoints the powerful 
regional governors and they in turn appoint the district executives, or akims,
who enjoy the power of eminent domain.45 Executive control over 
Kazakhstan’s judicial system is even stronger, with the president directly 
appointing all judges, even in district courts.46 These factors have contributed 
to Kazakhstan’s stable ranking as “Not Free” by Freedom House since 
independence.47
Kazakhstan lacks the checks on state authority thought to create secure 
property rights.  At the same time, approaches like those discussed above, 
which emphasize strategic interaction between rulers and their constituents, 
draw directly from Olson’s account of “roving” versus “stationary” bandits.48
Olson argues that, in contrast to roving bandits, stationary bandits––who 
“monopolize and rationalize theft in the form of taxes”––will limit their 
predation to ensure subjects have an incentive to engage in future production, 
thus improving their “take” over the long haul.49 In short, the decision to stay 
put leads autocrats to limit their extraction in the present so that they can take 
more over the long term.  A secure and stable autocrat like Nazarbayev 
arguably approaches this ideal, and suggests some rationale for property 
rights protection in the Kazakhstani context.
Though appropriate on a more general level, there are two primary issues 
with applying Olson’s theory to the Kazakhstani case.  First, in countries 
where autocrats derive most of their income from natural resources—as is the 
case in Kazakhstan, where oil revenues comprise close to 40% of GDP50—
the impetus to become a “good” stationary bandit is limited. Instead, what 
really matters is satisfying the narrow selectorate, or group of supporters who 
https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results [https://perma.cc/G2LB-EVGM];
Kazakhstan, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/
kazakhstan [https://perma.cc/QGK8-YAXJ] (last visited Nov. 11, 2016).
42. See Corruption Perceptions Index, supra note 41.
43. RULE BY LAW, supra note 23.
44. See Corruption Perceptions Index, supra note 41; Kazakhstan, FREEDOM HOUSE,
supra note 41.
45. See KONSTITUTࢎSIIࢎA RESPUBLIKI RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN [KONST. RK]
[CONSTITUTION] art. 87 (1995) (Kaz.).
46. Id. art. 82. 
47. Kazakhstan, FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 41.
48. See Mancur Olson, Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development, 87 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 567, 567–69 (1993).
49. Id.
50. See Kazakhstan, NAT. RESOURCE GOVERNANCE INST., http://www.resource
governance.org/countries/eurasia/kazakhstan/overview [https://perma.cc/NCR2-5YYA]
(last visited Nov. 5, 2016).  
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ensure the autocrat’s continued rule51; this only stands to exacerbate the issue 
of a lack of credible restrictions.  Second, the theory accounts only for an 
autocrat’s actions, and says little about those of his subordinates; one of the 
key tasks that any dictator faces is controlling his agents.  That said, Olson’s
argument regarding “roving bandits” translates relatively neatly to local 
politics.  Citizens regularly complain that appointed local executives seek 
only to maximize their personal wealth; one cited a discussion with a minor 
official’s housecleaner, who had described a home filled with “gold, fancy 
china, everything—that should be ours, it’s our [citizens’] money.”52 These 
officials are beholden only to those central or regional officials who appoint 
them.  Where central officials frequently shuffle their underlings to ensure 
loyalty to the autocrat, as is common in Kazakhstan,53 limited time horizons 
and a lack of ties to local populations increase incentives for “banditry.”
Indeed, a growing body of literature shows that most state threats to property 
come not from the autocrat, but rather from local officials.54
Therefore, we should not expect that local officials have much 
motivation to obey the law or refrain from stealing as much property as 
possible during their tenure.  What really matters is their loyalty to their 
political patron.  This line of reasoning has troubling implications for the 
country’s overall economic development.  Political science, economic, and 
legal scholars widely agree that without a state that upholds private property 
rights, incentives to innovate and invest are undermined, as individuals or 
firms cannot be sure they will retain any payoffs that come from taking that 
risk.55 Douglass North forcefully advanced the importance of property rights 
in reducing transaction costs, which in turn facilitates growth,56 and 
subsequent studies have provided support for this thesis.57 Avinash Dixit 
goes so far as to argue that states’ ability to provide secure property rights
“underpins the whole Smithian process whereby individuals specialize in 
different tasks and then transact with one another to achieve the full economic 
potential of the society.”58 Thus, making secure property rights both an 
essential component of economic governance and a core function of the 
51. See Bruce Bueno De Mesquita et al., Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the 
Survival of Leaders, 32 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 559, 561 (2002).
52. Interview with Landholder 12, in Astana, Kaz. (Dec. 2015).
53. Kadyrjan Smagulov, Personnel Shifts in Kazakhstan: Traditional Rotation or a 
New Political Course?, 14 CENT. ASIA & CAUCASUS 138, 138 (2013), http://cyber
leninka.ru/article/n/personnel-shifts-in-kazakhstan-traditional-rotation-or-a-new-political
-course [https://perma.cc/S6FX-FKLX].
54. Markus, supra note 26; JORDAN GANS-MORSE, VIOLENCE, LAW, AND PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: INSTITUTIONAL DEMAND IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA (forthcoming) (manuscript at 3).
55. Haggard et al., supra note 17.
56. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 11–16 (1990).
57. See generally Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Institutions and Economic 
Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures, 7 ECON. &
POL. 207, 207–24 (1995); Daron Acemoglu et al., Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of 
Long-Run Growth (Working Paper No. 10481, 2005).
58. Avinash Dixit, Governance Institutions and Economic Activity, 99 AMER. ECON.
REV. 5, 6 (2009).
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modern state.
The reasoning outlined above implies three outcomes for Kazakhstan.  
First, property rights should be inherently insecure, because the regime is both 
a personalist dictatorship and dependent on oil revenue.  Second, because 
what really matters are informal loyalties, the regime has no reason to invest 
more than superficially in developing civil laws and courts to deal with 
property disputes.  Therefore, insecurity should stem from “breaking” or 
failing to enforce property laws that serve as window-dressing for an 
international audience keen to promote democracy and rule of law.  Finally, 
we should see negative economic fallout in the form of low investment in the 
property under threat.  These economic consequences should be tied to the 
specific property that is insecure: if land rights are insecure, land investments 
will plummet.
I find that property rights to land in Kazakhstan reflect the first of these 
outcomes, but defy the others.  Qualitative evidence points to widespread 
insecurity surrounding land rights, but the form that insecurity takes tends to 
be legal within existing statutes.59  Moreover, contrary to expectations that 
laws and courts would be primarily ornamental, both citizens and regime 
officials extensively invest in and use legal codes, laws, and the judicial 
system.  For example, numerous cases are heard in courts each day, and 
citizens and officials alike attend hearings and draw on relevant legislation in 
their arguments.60 Finally, we have not seen the tepid real estate market that 
we would expect under conditions of insecurity.61
III. Institutional and Other Investments
This section examines issues of investment—in laws, in courts, and in 
land in urban areas.  In other words, it establishes that these institutions do
matter for the regime and for citizens; subsequent discussion focuses on how
they matter.  This Article shows that the regime has invested in laws and 
courts for dispute resolution and that citizens are willing to use the laws and 
courts for this purpose—even when disputes involve state officials.  In 
addition, rising land prices suggest some property rights security exists.  By 
investment, I refer to spending limited or scarce resources on creating, 
maintaining, expanding, or utilizing these institutions; essentially, the term 
denotes their consistent, active use.  This Article focuses on three regions of 
Kazakhstan which, according to official evaluations, have seen the most 
59. Ethnographic Notes, Courts, in Astana, Kaz. (Nov. 2015, Nov.–Dec. 2016). 
60. Supreme Court Data, supra note 4; see OMBUDSMAN REPUBLIC KAZ., 2008
ACTIVITY REPORT 34 (2009); see also Serik Sabekov, V tekuschem godu sudebnoj sisteme 
RK vydelat 40 mlrd. Tenge—K. Mami [This Year Kazakhstan Judicial System has Beaten 
40 Billion Tenge], KAZINFORM (July 18, 2014), http://inform.kz/rus/article/2679035
[https://perma.cc/F43X-DCHK].
61. Rost tsen, supra note 16; see Analytical Service kn.kz, Analitichesij obzor rynka 
zemel’nykh uchastkov Astanyza IV kvartal 2014 [Analytical Review of the Market of Land 
in Astana for the IV Quarter 2014], FORBES KAZ. (Feb. 19, 2015),
http://forbes.kz/process/property/zemlya_v_astane_podeshevela_za_god_na_8
[https://perma.cc/GAD8-QTER].
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conflict over land rights: the capital, Astana; the “commercial capital,” 
Almaty; and Shymkent, the densely populated “Southern capital.”62
This Article begins with the difficult task of assessing Kazakhstan's 
investment in law.  Quantifying exactly how much money and effort has been 
dedicated to developing, implementing, and enforcing laws in general—as 
opposed to property laws, specifically—poses substantial methodological 
challenges and is not the central aim of this Article.  Instead, budget 
information, court statistics, and qualitative evidence regarding investments 
together paint a clear picture of formal institutions that have received 
substantial backing from Kazakhstan’s central government and which are 
regularly (and voluntarily) utilized by citizens.  These investments call into 
question the idea that law's utility is limited to ornamentation.
One such measure is government spending: in 2014, the budget for 
courts reportedly totaled forty billion tenge, or about $200 million.63 Several 
hundred million more tenge were dedicated to centrally mandated initiatives 
designed to boost record keeping, provision of information, and legal 
services.64 Because of Kazakhstan’s oft-cited corruption, claims that “100% 
of the budget was fulfilled/carried out”65 should not be taken purely at face 
value, nonetheless, informal discussions with major international 
organizations suggest that there has been real support for initiatives like these 
at high levels of the Ministry of Justice.66 Doubtlessly, some proportion of 
these funds will end up lining officials’ pockets, but many programs have 
generated visible products.67 A key example is the degree to which court 
schedules, decisions, statutes, and other legal information are available online 
and are regularly updated and maintained.68
Spending alone does not guarantee that these efforts are anything more 
than particularly expensive, elaborate “window-dressing,” but there are 
additional reasons to believe that these initiatives are taking effect.  First, they 
extend to a level of complexity and depth that suggests they serve another 
62. GENERAL’NOJ PROKURATURY RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN [GENERAL PROSECUTOR 
OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN], DEPARTAMENT PO PREDSTAVITEL’STVU INTERESOV 
GOSUDARSTVA V SUDAKH [REPRESENTATIVE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT IN COURTS],
ANALIZ TEKUSCHEJ SITUATSII [ANALYSIS OF CURRENT SITUATION] (2013), 
http://online.zakon.kz/document/?doc_id=31347775 [https://perma.cc/43MT-2QW7].
63. See Sabekov, supra note 60.
64. See Razdel Grazhdanskij Budzhet [Section Civil Budget], MINISTERSTVO JUSTICII 
RESPUBLIKI KAZAHSTAN [THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN],
(Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.adilet.gov.kz/ru/node/94262 [https://perma.cc/874Q-CB4W]
(last updated May 17, 2016) [hereinafter Section Civil Budget].
65. Id.
66. Personal Correspondence, International Organization, in Astana, Kaz. (July 
2015).
67. See Supreme Court Data, supra 4.  Another example is the Supreme Court’s
application, Sud.kz, which is available in the app store.  See Section Civil Budget, supra
note 64.
68. Supreme Court Data, supra 4; see SoyuzPravoInform, Organy oficial’nogo 
opublikovanija [Bodies of Official Publication], ZAKONODATELމSTVO KAZAɏSTANA 
[LEGISLATION OF KAZAKHSTAN], http://kz.spinform.ru/organi.html [https://perma.cc/
QZY4-AZG8] (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).
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purpose; second (and more critically), they are actually utilized, and what’s
more, they are utilized consistently.69 The former encompasses not only 
funds spent, but also time, manpower, and expertise.  Kazakhstan’s Land 
Code alone spans over a hundred pages and has been updated numerous times 
since its introduction in 2003.70 Moreover, the Code’s introduction was 
highly controversial71: in a highly unusual occurrence for authoritarian 
Kazakhstan, Parliament dissolved due to intense disagreement over certain 
provisions of the Code.72 Other laws involving property, such as the 
controversial 2011 Law on State Property (Zakon o Gos Imushestve),73
provide extensive guidelines regarding how property should be appraised, 
registered, and the like.  Before introducing these laws, working groups that 
include officials from affected ministries, key stakeholders (such as leaders 
of professional associations and leading academics), along with the 
president’s administration spend substantial time and effort to develop the 
laws.74 This level of detail and attention to revision makes little sense if laws 
do not matter for governance.  Why bother with hundreds upon hundreds of 
pages of detailed documentation and the manpower required to create them—
or even risk your political career to oppose laws in the case of the Land 
Code—if they are empty and meaningless?
Interviews with attorneys and those involved in court cases further 
suggest that we should hesitate before discounting legislation on property 
rights.  They have become an occasional focal point not only for opposition 
from deputies, but also among citizens and professionals.  Landholders 
(especially those who had been involved in litigation) repeatedly complained 
about specific provisions in the Law on State Property, and that law has 
generated vocal opposition among prominent members of Kazakhstan’s legal 
and appraisal professional associations.75 A recent article in an Almaty law 
journal on the topic (Almaty has, by far, the largest attorney’s association in
the country), called for courts “to be more independent in considering 
69. Ethnographic Notes, Courts, in Astana, Kaz. (Nov. 2015, Nov. 2016); see Land 
Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, supra note 33; see also O gosudarstvennom 
immushestve (s izmeneniyami i dopolneniyami po sostoyaniu na 04.12.2015 r.) [ZK RK]
[Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on State Property (with changes and amendments as 
of Apr. 9, 2016)], Mar. 1, 2011, No. 413-IV (Kaz.), translated at http://online.zakon.
kz/Document/?doc_id=30947363&doc_id2=30947363#sub_id=1001853411&sub_id2=6
70000&sel_link=1001853411 [https://perma.cc/7D49-HWQH] [hereinafter Law on State 
Property].
70. See Land Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, supra note 33.
71. Interview with Expert 9, in Astana, Kaz. (June 2015); see Marat Yermukhanov, 
Cabinet Reshuffle in Kazakhstan Diffuses Political Crisis, CEN. ASIA-CAUCASUS ANALYST
(June 18, 2003), http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/field-reports/item/8141-field-
reports-caci-analyst-2003-6-18-art-8141.html [https://perma.cc/RXY7-DVER].
72. Interview with Organization 9, in Astana, Kaz. (June 2015)
73. See Law on State Property, supra note 69.
74. Interview with Academic 10, in Astana, Kaz. (Dec. 2015); Interview with 
Appraiser 7, in Almaty, Kaz. (Dec. 2015); Interview with Attorney 25, in Almaty, Kaz. 
(Dec. 2015).
75. Interviews with Appraisers 1–5, in Astana, Kaz. (May–June 2015); Interview with 
Appraiser 7, in Almaty, Kaz. (Oct. 2015). 
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petitions of lawyers to apply to the Constitutional Council of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan in recognizing certain legal norms [as] unconstitutional.”76 If 
laws are designed to be low-cost decoration, it seems puzzling that the regime 
would choose to retain ones that have generated such widespread and vocal 
dissatisfaction.
An even bigger cue as to civil law and courts’ import for property rights 
can be summed up by court schedules.  Civil court dockets show that civil 
courts at all levels—from district courts to the Supreme Court (Verkhovnui 
Sud)—regularly hear disputes over property, particularly land disputes.77
Based on these schedules, the proportion of land-related disputes among 
citizens and state officials approaches 10% of total civil court caseloads in 
some districts.78 These district-level data likely underestimate the true 
frequency.  Visits to those courts demonstrated that courts were not always 
vigilant when it came to entering cases into the online scheduling system; at 
times, a relatively empty court docket in the system revealed in actuality a 
packed courtroom waiting area and several cases not listed on the schedule.79
In the Astana City Court, land and housing/property disputes are so common 
that for two days of the week, two judges focus specifically on these cases.80
Multiple visits confirmed that the majority of these cases are between citizens 
and state officials, and are usually attended by both parties.81 In short, both 
the state and citizens regularly use the formal institutions tasked with 
addressing legal conflicts over land rights.
At the same time, attorneys tend to characterize these cases in the same 
way that the literature suggests these cases should occur in Kazakhstan: land-
related cases against the government are proigraushiie, or losing cases.82
Hopelessness combined with high usage suggests that at a systemic level, we 
do indeed see insecure property rights; seizures are common, as are other 
varieties of land disputes with public officials, and citizens rarely find 
themselves with a clear victory over state actors.83 Attorneys consistently 
cite this threat from officials as their clients’ greatest worry related to land 
rights.84
76. See =KDMODXRY%DW\UɯDQ5\VNDOLHYLFKK voprosu o protivorechii nekotorykh norm 
dejstvuiuschego zakonodatel’stva Konstitutsii Respubliki Kazakhstan i mezhdunarodnym 
obiazatel’stvam Kazakhstana [To a Question About the Contradiction of Some of the 
Current Legislation of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan and Kazakhstan’s
International Commitments], 3–4 (45–46) ADVOKATY ALMATY 47, 47–52 (2015) (Kaz).
77. Author’s collected data from Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
(2013–2015). 
78. Id.
79. Ethnographic Notes, Courts, in Astana, Kaz. (Nov. 2015).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Interview 2 with Attorney 23, in Astana, Kaz. (Dec. 2015). 
83. Supreme Court Data, supra note 4; see OMBUDSMAN OF REP. OF KAZ., 2008
ACTIVITY REPORT 24 (Org. Sec. Cooperation Eur. Ctr. in Astana trans., 2008), 
http://www.eoi.at/d/EOI%20-%20Jahresberichte/Kasachstan/itog_2008.doc
[https://perma.cc/C4AP-QUMF].
84. Interviews with Attorneys 1–32, in Astana, Almaty, and Shymkent, Kaz. (Sept. 
2014–Dec. 2015). 
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This widespread perception that land rights are insecure suggests that we 
should not see a willingness to invest in land, especially in the areas where 
seizure is common.  Yet, in the same neighborhoods that have been subject 
to large-scale seizure, we see enormous growth and development.85 Huge 
housing and commercial developments have sprung up each year, and 
construction cranes are ubiquitous throughout Astana, Almaty, and 
Shymkent.86 Often, lands seized for state needs are needed only partially for 
public use, and the local executive government resells the remaining, so-
called “leftover,” lands.  Crucially, citizens are buying these lands.87 In other 
words, the omnipresent threat of seizure has not curbed demand.  Land prices 
in these areas have also trended upwards over the past decade 
(chronologically, they correlate not with reported spikes in seizures, but 
rather with larger global and regional economic crises in 2008 and 2015–
2016, respectively).88
In other words, it seems that some have enough confidence in the 
security of their land rights to invest—while others suffer from pervasive 
insecurity.  Why do some people or firms have enough confidence to sink 
enormous sums into land?  Writing about China, Oi finds that universally 
secure, private property rights are not essential for investment and 
development; what is needed “are secure property rights for some organized 
unit and sufficient incentives for that unit to pursue growth.”89 How can we 
characterize this heterogeneous security—what “units” in Kazakhstan 
experience insecurity?  Which enjoy security, and why? In short, returning 
to the motivating question of this paper, what role do law and courts play in 
shaping these outcomes—how do they matter for property rights security?
IV. Land, Law, and Local Officials
Though post-Soviet Kazakhstan embodies an environment where one 
should not expect the law or courts to offer property rights security, regime 
investment and citizen engagement suggest otherwise.  At the same time, the 
85. Ethnographic Notes, in Astana, Almaty, and Shymkent, Kaz. (Nov. 2015, Nov.–
Dec. 2016). See generally NATIONS IN TRANSIT, KAZAKHSTAN 18 (2008), 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2008/kazakhstan
[https://perma.cc/M9UW-JCHA].
86. Ethnographic Notes, in Astana, Almaty, and Shymkent, Kaz. (Nov. 2015, Nov.–
—Dec. 2016); see, e.g., Matthew Yeomans, Dispatch from Kazakhstan, SLATE (July 19, 
2004), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/dispatches/2004/07/dispatch_
from_kazakhstan.html [https://perma.cc/F775-44N7].
87. Interview with Attorney 2, in Astana, Kaz. (Oct. 2014); Interviews with Attorneys 
10, 11, in Shymkent, Kaz. (Apr. 2015); see Yigal Chazan, Kazakh President Rattled by 
Land Privatisation Protests, INTELLINEWS (May 4, 2016),
http://www.intellinews.com/alaco-dispatches-kazakh-president-rattled-by-land-
privatisation-protests-96561/ [https://perma.cc/2TAB-DRY7].
88. See generally Zemlja v Astane Stoit v Srednem $8340 za Sotku [Land is Astana is
an Average of $8340 per sq.m.], FORBES KAZ. (Feb. 19, 2015),
http://forbes.kz/process/property/zemlya_v_astane_podeshevela_za_god_na_8
[https://perma.cc/2ADY-8V3U].
89. See Jean C. Oi, Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State 
Corporatism in China, 45 WORLD POL. 99, 100 (1992) (emphasis in original).
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most commonly mentioned threat to land rights—seizure for eminent 
domain—stems from state actors.  Specifically, Kazakhstan’s Land Code 
grants the local executive government, or akimat, extensive authority over 
land rights, including the right of eminent domain.90  These officials are 
widely accused of using that power for their own enrichment.91 Without 
electoral or other direct accountability to citizens, this has predictably 
resulted in a situation where “everything associated with land is 
complicated.”92
V. Characterizing Land Rights
Although private ownership of land exists in Kazakhstan, the state is, 
according to the Land Code, the ultimate owner.93  Land rights can take 
several different forms.  First is the distinction among categories of land use: 
agricultural; housing or settlements; industry, transport, communications, 
defense and other non-agricultural purposes; protected areas (parks, etc.); 
forest; water resources; and reserve (land fund).94 Lands designated for 
dachas (summer cottages) and individual/family gardens fall within the first 
category.95 Land that it is not used in accordance with its designated use can 
be seized by district or city officials.96 While it is possible to transfer the 
category of use—for example, from agricultural to individual dwelling—this 
process requires consent from the district or city akimat.97 Interviewees cited 
the process as difficult, with only about 20% of requests approved.98 Second, 
land can fall under either public or private ownership.99 Restrictions on land 
use remain regardless of ownership status, and land that is not used in 
accordance with its categorization may still be seized for illegal use.100 Land 
that is state-owned can be transferred into private ownership if lessees receive 
permission from the city or district akimat and pay the cadastral value.101
In rural areas, land is primarily held in long-term leases from the state 
that last forty-nine years.102 These rights are inheritable but not alienable, and 
existing lessees have the first right of renewal when the term expires.103 In 
90. Land Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, supra note 33, arts. 8, 89.
91. Ethnographic Notes, Esilskii Neighborhood, in Astana, Kaz. (Sept. 2015); 
Ethnographic Notes, Almatinskii Neighborhood, in Astana, Kaz. (Oct.–Nov. 2015); see, 
e.g., Catherine Putz, Massive Kazakh Corruption Case Targets 21 Former Officials,
DIPLOMAT (Sept. 10, 2015), http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/massive-kazakh-corruption-
case-targets-21-former-officials/ [https://perma.cc/N79V-RAEN].
92. Interview with Expert 5, in Almaty, Kaz. (Apr. 2015). 
93. Land Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, supra note 33, art. 3.
94. Id. art. 1.
95. Id.
96. Id. arts. 43, 170.
97. Id. art. 49(1–6).
98. Interview with Attorney 5, in Astana, Kaz. (Mar. 2015).
99. Land Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, supra note 33, art. 3.
100. Interview with Official 2, in Shymkent, Kaz. (Feb. 2015).
101. Land Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, supra note 33, art. 3.
102. Id. art. 35(2); Interview with Academic 7, in Almaty, Kaz. (Oct. 2014). 
103. Land Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, supra note 33, arts. 36(3), 40(1–3). 
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the 1990s, land that belonged to former collective farms was originally 
distributed as shares; many of these were bought and consolidated by former 
farm directors, whose ownership today tends to be held in the form of limited-
liability firms (“TOO”).104 Those who retained their shares later had to 
convert them into certificates for particular plots.105 Plot assignation was 
decided at plenary sessions of the former collective farm; though conflict did 
occur at the local level during redistribution, redistribution was largely 
completed by the early 2000s.106  Though land rights-holders may purchase 
their land (transfer it to private ownership), this practice is relatively rare.  
Few rural residents have the money or the motivation to do so because lease 
payments are low and limited to yearly payments of the land tax.107 The land 
tax is comprised of just 1% of the value of the land.108 This provides little 
incentive to shift to private ownership, except outside of expanding cities, 
where land values continue to rise.109 Thus, most land remains in long-term 
leases from the state. In contrast, in cities, private ownership is far more 
common.110 Urban residents received titles to apartments or land where they 
already resided, and as a result, rights to household plots within city limits 
are usually private.111 Many of these plots are designated for dacha, or 
garden, use, not full-time residence; but as cities have expanded, residents 
have built more permanent residences on them.112 At the same time, urban 
district akimats still own some land, and have the right to seize additional 
plots for state needs.113
Kazakh law stipulates that all land rights—private or otherwise (e.g., 
long-term leases)—must be registered with the Ministry of Justice.114
Without registration, no state agency recognizes an individual’s or firm’s land 
rights.115 Formal rights to land begin only from the moment of registration.116
Thus, anyone who has any legal basis to land has a strong incentive to register 
it, and many do; especially in urban and rural areas, respondents could 
104. Interview with Organization 4, in Almaty, Kaz. (Oct. 2014).
105. Id.; Interviews with Experts 1 and 3, in Almaty, Kaz. (Oct. 2014, Jan. 2015). 
106. Interview 1 with Official 2, in Shymkent, Kaz. (Oct. 2014); Interview with Farmer 
3, in Shymkent, Kaz. (Feb. 2015).
107. Land Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, supra note 33, art. 10(1–3); Interview 
1 with Official 2, in Shymkent, Kaz. (Oct. 2014).
108. Interview 1 with Official 2, in Shymkent, Kaz. (Oct. 2014); Interview with 
Organization 4, in Almaty, Kaz. (Oct. 2014); Interview with Farmer 1, in Almaty, Kaz. 
(Jan. 2015).
109. Interview with Organization 4, in Almaty, Kaz. (Oct. 2014).
110. Interviews with Academics 6 and 7, in Almaty, Kaz. (Oct. 2015). 
111. Id.; see JOHN C. DALY, CENTRAL ASIA-CAUCASUS INSTITUTE & SILK ROAD 
STUDIES PROGRAM, KAZAKHSTAN’S EMERGING MIDDLE CLASS 1, 32 (2008).
112. Interview with Attorney 8, in Astana, Kaz. (Apr. 2015).
113. See generally Botakoz Dykanbayeva, Kazakhstan Real Estate 2016, ICLG (May 
2, 2016), http://www.iclg.co.uk/practice-areas/real-estate/real-estate-2016/kazakhstan
[https://perma.cc/NJZ8-2M9B].
114. Land Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, supra note 33, art. 43.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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generally produce an akt na zemlu (land act/certificate).117  In newly settled 
peri-urban areas, respondents were more likely to lack these documents, and 
did not pursue legalizatsiia, or legal registration of land, until they were 
preparing to sell it (registration is required for a sale to be valid and for rights 
to transfer).118 In addition to residents in these “suburban” settlements, those 
who obtained land through inheritance sometimes did not register their land.  
They tended to provide other documents, such as proof of inheritance, when 
asked how they asserted their claim to a land plot.119 In such cases, 
landholders cited the time required to complete the registration process as the 
greatest barrier to formalizing their land rights.120 Attorneys and some 
companies register property for landholders, and on average, indicate that 
registration required 1–2 months to complete.121 For individuals not familiar 
with the process, it takes an additional 2–4 months.122 When asked why, 
respondents tended to cite the number of documents required, fees, and the
need to visit multiple government offices as the reasons for the long delay.123
Only in one region did respondents regularly cite the need to pay bribes to 
accomplish any of the above functions.124 Indeed, an attorney who 
specialized in helping clients with property registration stated that she chose 
this area of practice because it was relatively straightforward and free from 
corruption.125
Even where people have not registered their land, they generally have a 
formal, state-recognized documentary basis for their ownership or use 
claim.126 In other words, property rights require formal, state-law backed 
means. Rights to property are derived from formal, legal documentation, and 
both citizens and the state acknowledge this state of affairs.127 Moreover, 
courts recognize legally-proscribed documents in disputes, even against state 
officials: in one court case over seizure for state needs, officials failed to pay 
compensation to a woman whose rights to a garage stemmed from inheritance 
(for which she had a valid, notarized certificate).128 Under law, she had a 
limited period in which to register the property even after notice of seizure, 
117. Ethnographic Notes, Village, in Almatinskii Oblast’, Kaz. (Feb. 2015); 
Ethnographic Notes, Neighborhoods/Villages, in Astana, Kaz. (Nov. 2015). 
118. Ethnographic Notes, Village, in Almatinskii Oblast’, Kaz. (Feb. 2015); 
Ethnographic Notes, Neighborhoods/Villages, in Astana, Kaz. (Nov. 2015).
119. Ethnographic Notes, Neighborhoods/Villages, in Astana, Kaz. (Nov. 2015).
120. E.g., Interviews with Landholders 7 and 8, in Astana, Kaz. (Nov. 2015).
121. Attorney Interviews, all field sites; Attorney Interview 23.1, in Astana, Kaz. (Oct. 
2015).
122. Attorney Interviews, all field sites.
123. Id.
124. Interview with Attorney 3, in Shymkent, Kaz. (Feb. 2015).
125. Interview 1 with Attorney 23, in Astana, Kaz. (Oct. 2015).
126. Land Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, supra note 33, art. 32; Author’s Survey 
Data, in Astana & bordering districts (July–Aug. 2016); Interviews with Landowners, in 
Almaty, Astana, and Shymkent, Kaz.
127. Land Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, supra note 33, art. 43; Ethnographic 
Notes, Courts, in Astana, Kaz. (Oct.–Nov. 2015).
128. Ethnographic Notes, Courts, in Astana, Kaz. (Oct.–Nov. 2015).
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and she signed an agreement with the akimat’s agent to do so.  After that 
point, she was to receive compensation, but she never did.129  In court, 
officials tried to argue that because the property had not been registered, they 
owed her nothing; the judge upheld the woman's claim.130
Of course, that does not mean that these formal rights to property operate 
free from informal influence.  Most direct formal authority for administering 
land rights rests with the local akimat, including the authority to grant new 
leases, approve lease extensions and renewals, approve land sales, seize land 
for state needs, and transfer land from one category of use to another.131 Only 
private land sales do not require an akim’s approval; essentially, he or she 
acts as the single channel for an extensive range of decisions related to land 
rights.  In each district there is a land committee, responsible for reviewing 
applications and providing recommendations to the akim.132 These local-
level land committees are also those responsible for surveying and 
establishing boundaries to land.133 Surprisingly, committee members are 
appointed separately from their counterparts at the next-higher level of 
government (oblast, for rural districts, and city, for urban districts) in the 
Department of Land Relations, and operate under the local akim’s
supervision.134
Though this Article has referred throughout to “local officials,” 
clarifying the relationship among various levels of local government is 
critical for understanding land rights security.  Kazakhstan is a centralized 
state, with a vertical structure of authority.135 There are four levels of 
executive authority: national (presidential); provincial (oblast/cities of 
republican significance, such as Almaty and Astana); district (raion/cities of 
provincial significance, orgoroda oblast’nogo naznacheniia); and rural 
(sel’skii okrug).136 The president appoints provincial heads (akims), who then 
appoint the next level of executives (also called akims), and so on.137 These 
appointees are not beholden to citizens, but rather to the next rung up in the 
vertical hierarchy.  Provincial authorities make decisions about land rights 
related to “mass-scale projects,” like the granting of land rights for mineral 
129. Id.
130. Ethnographic Notes, Courts, in Astana, Kaz. (Oct. 2015).
131. Land Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, supra note 33, art. 17.
132. Id. art. 9; DIREKTSIIA “ZEMEL’NOGO KADASTRA I TEKHNICHESKOGO 
OBSLEDOVANIIA NEDVIZHIMOSTI” [DIRECTION “LAND CADASTRE AND TECHNICAL SURVEY 
OF REAL ESTATE”], http://www.kazlands.kz/ [https://perma.cc/2LNT-G3GS] (last visited 
Dec. 14, 2016).
133. Interview with Attorney 12, in Shymkent, Kaz. (Apr. 2015).
134. Interview with Official 2, in Shymkent, Kaz. (Feb. 2015).
135. A. Abikenov, Pravovye osnovy vybornosti akimov v Respublik Kazahstan [Legal 
Basis for Election of Akims of Kazahkstan], ARICLEKZ (2009), http://articlekz.com/
article/6858 [https://perma.cc/A7GR-3SZF] (last visited Feb. 5, 2017).
136. KONSTITUTࢎSIIࢎA RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN [KONST. RK] [CONSTITUTION] (1995) 
(Kaz.); Yucel Ogurlu, An Essay on Main Provisions of the Constitution of Republic of 
Kazahkstan on Organization of State and Administration 1 AÜEHFD, C.V,S. 121, 123, 
125 (2001).
137. KONSTITUTࢎSIIࢎA RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN [KONST. RK] [CONSTITUTION] art. 87
(1995) (Kaz.); Ogurlu, supra note 136, at 123.
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exploration),138 but again, most official transactions involving land occur at 
the district level.139 Rural akims have similar authority to district akims
within the narrow geographic bounds of their districts, but can only 
recommend seizure for misuse or state needs.140 District authorities must 
provide approval.141 Moreover, any reassignment of land rights at this level 
must be registered with district authorities.142 One respondent went so far as 
to highlight this specifically: the rural akim had to pay the district akim to
look the other way when he took unused land and re-registered it in family 
members’ names.143 Interestingly, this link does not necessarily extend 
further upwards in the power vertical.  Land is incorporated into the national 
registration system at the district level.144 That registration effectively 
compartmentalizes land rights at the lowest two levels of government.  Within 
this “black box,” higher-level executives have limited direct information or 
involvement.
This suggests principal-agent problems if we ignore courts’ role in 
enforcing property rights.  Where individuals or companies feel their rights 
have been violated, they can pursue a case in court; this likely helps explain 
why the official mentioned above took empty land.  The sheer number of 
land-related civil cases suggests that we should not dismiss the courts’ role in 
these disputes.  By official calculations, courts ruled on 1,198 cases between
2012–2013,145 and attorneys cited on average about 10% of their caseloads as 
pertaining to land-related disputes.146 Unlike the system of local government, 
all judges are directly accountable to the executive; the president personally 
appoints all judges, who are (informally even more than formally) under the 
close supervision of the chairman (predsedatel’) of the court.147 That 
chairman further ensures that his or her court's rulings comply closely with 
national policy (so, the executive's wishes).148 Thus, while the structure of 
courts echoes that of executive government, with district, oblast/special-
status city, and national levels, courts serve as a far more reliable and loyal 
agent.  These experts acknowledge that the capture of local judges by district 
or provincial officials does occur, but assert that this phenomenon has 
138. Interview with Attorney 6, in Astana, Kaz. (Mar. 2015).
139. Land Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, supra note 33, art. 19.
140. Interview with Official 2.2, in Shymkent, Kaz. (Feb. 2015). 
141. Id.
142. Ethnographic Notes, Neighborhoods/Villages, S. Kaz. (Feb. 2015).
143. Id.
144. Interview with Attorney 12, in Shymkent, Kaz. (Apr. 2015).
145. SPRAVKA O SOBLUDENII ZAKONODATEL’STVA I SUDEBNO-PROKURORSKOJ PRAKTIKE 
PO VOPROSAM IZ’YATIYA ZEMEL’NYKH UCHASTKOV DLYA GOSURDARSTVENNYKH NUZHD ZA 
2012–2013 GODA [EVALUATION OF THE OBSERVANCE OF LAW AND JUDICIAL-
PROSECUTORIAL PRACTICE IN QUESTIONS OF SEIZURE OF LAND PLOTS FOR STATE NEEDS 
FROM 2012–2013], at 2 (Mar. 12, 2014) [hereinafter SPRAVKA].
146. Attorney Interviews 1–32, all sites and dates. 
147. Interview with Academic 8, in Almaty, Kaz. (June 2015); Interview with Attorney 
16, in Almaty, Kaz. (June 2015).
148. Interview with Academic 8, in Almaty, Kaz. (June 2015); Interview with Attorney 
16, in Almaty, Kaz. (June 2015).
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declined significantly now that judges are paid directly from the republican 
budget.149 Moreover, the relatively open appeals system means that higher 
courts “check” the degree to which lower courts’ decisions align with 
executive demands.150 Land disputes are first heard in the district court where 
the land under dispute is located (or, for cases between legal entities, in 
special inter-district economic courts), but if either party is unhappy with that 
court's decision, they can (and often do) pursue the case through the appellate 
courts and up to the Supreme Court in the capital, Astana.151  Knowing that 
their decisions are likely to be checked by higher-level courts has made lower 
courts hesitant to make rulings that challenge or contradict top-level practice.  
Local officials may exert informal influence over cases, but they are unlikely 
to do so in a way that challenges or conflicts with central policy.
Indeed, during court sessions, judges sometimes took the akimat to task 
through rulings or for unprofessional conduct.  In one case, the judge asked 
“How exactly do they work in the akimat?!” and chastised their attorney for 
failure to provide basic documents; in another, he threatened to open an 
administrative case against the department for their conduct.152 At the same 
time, both interviews and court observation suggested a regular pattern in 
legal rulings surrounding land disputes, especially those concerning seizure 
for state needs.  These reflected the 2011 Law on State Property, as well as a 
reported order from central government “not to drain the state budget” by 
providing too much compensation to owners of seized land.153 This law was 
drafted on direct order of the President in response to excessive payments for 
land seized during the construction of a portion of the Europe-China 
highway.154 While data on compensation offered over time is not available, 
attorneys were consistent in characterizing previous compensation as fair.155
Yet following the law’s introduction, the amount offered ceased to reflect 
market prices; falling exchange rates vis-a-vis the dollar compounded this 
issue.156 Courts may serve powerful local officials’ interests, but only appear 
to do so when those do not contradict top-down mandates.  Furthermore, their 
structure means courts serve as a largely self-monitoring institution.  In other 
words, judges appear to act as reliable agents of the central regime.
What, then, comprises existing top-level mandates concerning land 
rights?  And what accounts for the heterogeneity of property rights insecurity 
related to land? In order to address these questions, we need to understand 
exactly what shape the threats to land rights commonly take.
149. Interview with Academic 8, in Almaty, Kaz. (June 2015); Interview with Attorney 
16, in Almaty, Kaz. (June 2015).
150. Ethnographic Notes, Courts, in Astana, Kaz. (Nov. 2015). 
151. Id.
152. Ethnographic Notes, Courts, in Astana, Kaz. (Oct. 2015).
153. Interview with Appraiser 7, in Almaty, Kaz. (Dec. 2015).
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Interview with Attorney 23, in Astana, Kaz. (Oct. 2015).  
156. Ethnographic Notes, Courts, in Astana, Kaz. (Oct. and Nov. 2015). 
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VI. Threats to Land Rights
Property rights insecurity related to land takes several different forms in 
Kazakhstan.  Predictably, news reports suggest that it is concentrated in areas 
where land values are high: around rapidly expanding cities, and in areas 
where population density and agricultural value of land are high.157 Among 
the former are Almaty, Kazakhstan’s “commercial capital,” and the actual 
capital, Astana.158 Attorneys consistently cited six primary threats to land 
rights: (1) seizure for state needs; (2) seizure of land that has not been used 
according to the specified lease terms; (3) double-issue of land rights or other 
errors in assigning land rights; (4) refusal to renew or prolong lease rights; 
(5) issues with requests to change the categorization of land; and (6) seizure 
of neighbors’ or other individuals’ land.159 The first four boil down to conflict 
with the district/city akim, and this characterization is reflected in court 
dockets.160  Most common are cases concerning seizure for state needs, and 
are between district akimats/land committees, and individuals/companies.161
Interestingly, all four threats involving local officials are best 
characterized as allocation insecurity.  In other words, they occur under 
conditions allowed by existing legislation.  Even cases of outright seizure 
operated with legal pretense; officials did not simply appear and demand that 
individuals vacate the premises, but instead were careful to cite either state 
needs or failure to use land in accordance with its designation.162  Legal
insecurity—insecurity stemming from violations of the law—related to land 
appears far more limited, and where it does occur, overlaps with allocation 
insecurity.  For example, officials may fail to provide compensation for land 
seized under legal grounds for state needs.163 While seizure by neighbors or 
other citizens falls under the category of legal insecurity, it was rarely 
mentioned in interviews.  Yet this varied between North and South: in the 
North, respondents either mentioned legal insecurity last, or failed to mention 
it at all; in the South, where population pressures on land are higher and 
agricultural land is more valuable, it was far more common.164
Nonetheless, all those interviewed cited seizure by local akims as one of 
the most prevalent concerns surrounding land rights; the number one in the 
North, and among the top three in the South.165 Allocation insecurity 
remained at the top of the list when they were asked to consider these 
157. See Svetlana Glushkova, Astana: Gorod ili Gorozhan? [Astana: City for the 
Citizens?], RADIO AZATTYK (2016), http://rus.azattyq.org/a/azattyqlive-astana-gorod-
infrastruktura/28105325.html [https://perma.cc/T8LV-UKAT] (last visited Dec. 14, 
2016). 
158. Id. 
159. Attorney Interviews 1–32, all field sites (2014–2015).
160. Supreme Court Data, supra note 4. 
161. Id.
162. Ethnographic Notes, in Astana, Almatiskii, and Esilskii Districts, Kaz. (Sept.–
Nov. 2015). 
163. Interview with Attorney 14, in Shymkent, Kaz. (Apr. 2015).
164. Interviews with Landholders 2–3, in Shymkent, Kaz. (Feb. 2015); Interviews with
Landholders 4–8, in Astana, Kaz. (Sept.–Nov. 2015).
165. Interviews with Attorneys 1–32, all field sites (2014–2015). 
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concerns in the past five and ten years.166 The difference lay in its prevalence.  
In Astana, disputes over seizure were so common in the late 1990s and early 
2000s––shortly after the capital was relocated there from Almaty––that one 
long-practicing attorney worked solely on such cases for several years.167
Today, only about 15–20% of his cases are related to land.168 Again, 
however, the kinds of insecurity that his clients face have not changed.169
Attorneys in Almaty and Shymkent, as well as those who began practicing 
law more recently in Astana heavily stressed allocation insecurity, especially 
seizure for state needs.170 Conversations with landholders echoed attorneys’ 
evaluations: in the few remaining single-housing neighborhoods in Astana’s 
city center, those homeowners whose homes were not already in the process 
of being seized were extremely cognizant that they were likely to be 
threatened soon.  Many interviewed were in the midst of court cases over 
seizure.171 In the South, this issue is exacerbated, and extends to rural areas 
due to higher population pressures.172 Indeed, the failure to mention it first 
in the South may be due to greater political sensitivity surrounding 
government seizures there; one respondent called it a “very bitter issue” and 
noted that “people here are scared.”173
This qualitative data shows that most insecurity comes in technically 
legal forms; “complications” occur under the umbrella of the law, especially 
for state needs (eminent domain).  Legally, these seizures require 
“exceptional circumstances,” including construction of roads, engineering-
communications networks, and objects needed for state programs designed to 
serve the public good, such as schools.174 While these requirements may 
appear strict, eminent domain laws allow for seizure of an entire plot for, say, 
expansion or construction of a roadway.175 Often this construction does not 
occupy the full physical plot, and the akim’s office then finds itself the owner 
of very valuable real estate bordering the roadway—land that it then has the 
authority to sell.176 When landholders asked to relocate their homes to 
accommodate the roadway (but not to relinquish the entire plot), these claims 
166. Id. 
167. Interview with Attorney 8, in Astana, Kaz. (Apr. 2015).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Interviews with Attorneys 16, 25–31, in Almaty, Kaz. (June 2015, Dec. 2015); 
Interviews with Attorneys 9–12, 14, in Shymkent, Kaz. (Apr. 2015); Interviews with 
Attorneys 4–5, 23–24, in Astana, Kaz. (Apr.–Dec. 2015); see RFE/RL’s Kazakh Service, 
Kazakh Journalists, Activists Detained and Websites Blocked, RADIOFREEEUROPE 
RADIOLIBERTY (May 21, 2016), http://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-protests/
27748591.html [https://perma.cc/RKG3-ZE8V] (describing protests over changes to the 
land code and accompanying land seizures).
171. Ethnographic Notes, in Astana, Almatinskii District, Kaz. (Oct. 2015). 
172. Interview with Attorney 10, in Shymkent, Kaz. (Apr. 2015).
173. Interview with Attorney 12, in Shymkent, Kaz. (Apr. 2015).
174. Land Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, supra note 33, art. 84(1).
175. Interview with Attorney 10 and 11, in Shymkent, Kaz. (Apr. 2015). 
176. Id. 
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were denied.177 Similarly, large swaths of land have been seized for state 
needs for the construction of a kindergarten, but the proposed school occupies 
only a small part of the property under seizure; the remainder will be 
developed into apartment complexes.178 Technically, seizures such as these 
satisfy legal requirements, and under Kazakhstan’s code-law system, judges 
must decide the legal basis for such cases within the relatively broad terms 
defined by the law—and directives that come from above.179
The latter refers us back to the 2011 Law on State Property, which 
governs compensation in cases of seizure for state needs.180 Specifically, the 
law stipulates that the compensation offered should be equivalent to the sale 
price listed on the last agreement of sale or purchase agreement.181 However, 
this is in conflict with Kazakhstan's Land Code and Constitution.  While the 
former specifies compensation equal to the prevailing market price, the latter 
calls for “equivalent compensation.”182 In Kazakhstan’s legal hierarchy, both 
the Constitution and Land Code rank higher than any individual law,183 and 
on the question of compensation, the Law on State Property contradicts both.  
Nevertheless, the Law on State Property continues to remain in force.  As a 
result, there is an effective legal plurality, and judges appear to pick and 
choose which law to use when calculating compensation.184 When asked 
what explained the apparent lack of consistency in how compensation is 
determined, attorneys generally responded with a grimace.  As mentioned 
earlier, although the Law on State Property contradicts others, it remains on 
the books and provides judges a legal tool for managing state reimbursement 
for property seized.
Remaining within the formal legal framework in this way helps lower 
the risk associated with seizures.  Kazakhstan’s central government has made 
curbing corruption a prominent priority, a push that has led to the arrest of 
several district and regional executives.185 At the same time, the regime relies 
on a complex web of patron-client relationships for its continued rule—and 
the rents derived from being a chinovnik (official) in this system help 
177. Interview 1 with Attorney 23, in Astana, Kaz. (Oct. 2015).
178. Ethnographic Notes, Esilskii District, in Astana, Kaz. (Sept. 2015). 
179. Interview with Attorney 25, in Almaty, Kaz. (Dec. 2015); see Land Code of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, supra note 33, art. 84 (showing the broad nature of the Kazakh 
land code).
180. Law on State Property, supra note 69.
181. Id.
182. See KONSTITUTࢎSIIࢎA RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN [KONST. RK] [CONSTITUTION] art. 
26 § 3 (1995) (Kaz.); see also Land Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, supra note 33.
183. See KONSTITUTࢎSIIࢎA RESPUBLIKI KAZAKHSTAN [KONST. RK] [CONSTITUTION] art. 
26 § 3 (1995) (Kaz.); see also Land Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, supra note 33.
184. Ethnographic Notes, Courts, in Astana, Kaz. (Oct.–Dec. 2015).
185. See, e.g., Zaderzhan eshe Odin Zamestitel’ Akima Kostanaya [Detained Another 
Deputy Akim of Kostanai], NUR.KZ (Aug. 4, 2015), http://www.nur.kz/839878-
zaderzhan-eshche-odin-zamestitel-akima-k.html [https://perma.cc/H792-4DWY];
Nazarbaev Rasskazal Kazakhstantsam, Kak Pobedit’ Korruptsiu [Nazarbayev said 
Kazakhstan People How to Tackle Corruption], NUR.KZ (Dec. 13, 2015),
http://www.nur.kz/985704-nazarbaev-rasskazal-kazakhstancam-ka.html [https://perma.
cc/VK4T-76VF].
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underpin local officials’ loyalty.186 Laws are promulgated at the highest 
levels of Kazakhstan’s government, which justifies officials’ ability to seize
or conduct other forms of allocation insecurity in legal terms, because of the 
lower risks associated with their activities.  Moreover, “staying legal” is low-
cost; compensation for lands seized for state needs (even if those needs are 
local) comes from the central state budget.187 As a result, not only does the 
law provide officials a way to justify their actions to superiors and to citizens, 
it also costs them nothing—and the profits to be made from selling, say, 
“new” commercial road-side property can be enormous.  In Astana, for 
example, the average price for a single sotok, or 1/100 of a hectare, was 
$8,340 at the close of 2014.188
Thus, in economic terms, transaction costs associated with seizure and 
retaining land are limited when officials remain within legal bounds.  In this 
regard, local officials do not see their own budgets drained by compensation, 
and if they keep compensation within the limits communicated by centrally 
imposed law, the risk that seizures pose to these officials remains low.  By 
acting as middlemen who seize land and pass it to developers, who 
themselves are rumored to be intimately tied to the regime,189 local officials 
stand to make a great deal of money for themselves.  Staying within the law 
keeps their transaction costs low.  They do not pay to bring lawsuits in civil 
court,190 and as long as they can provide evidence that their seizure satisfies 
basic tenets of the law, courts—which, given their direct accountability to the 
executive, are already predisposed to support the state—are unlikely to rule 
against them.191  The greatest transaction cost besides risk to their position 
(which again, is mitigated by choosing legal means) is simply time and effort.  
If the property is valuable enough, even time spent defending against 
successive legal challenges will be insufficient to deter seizure, because the 
outcome is most likely to be higher payment for land rather than returning it 
to the original owner/lessee.
That said, local officials seek to lower even those costs.  One way of 
doing so is to take into account who they target for seizures.  Costs tend to be 
especially low involving poor or otherwise vulnerable individuals, who are 
less likely to have the time and financial means to pursue cases to their 
conclusion.  And even though Kazakhstan allows for a universal right of 
appeal in civil cases,192 officials do not need to pay to appeal court rulings, 
whereas citizens do.193 ɌKH fee to appeal is based on the total value of the 
186. See generally HENRY HALE, PATRONAL POLITICS: EURASIAN REGIME DYNAMICS 
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2015).
187. Interview with Official 3, in Astana, Kaz. (Dec. 2015).
188. Yeomans, supra note 86.
189. Interview with Political Geographer (June 2015).
190. Interview with Attorney 16, in Almaty, Kaz. (June 2015).
191. Interview with Attorney 25, in Almaty, Kaz. (Dec. 2015).
192. Grazhdanskii Protsessual’nui Kodeks Respubliki Kazakhstan [GPK RK] [Code of 
Civil Procedure of the Republic of Kazakhstan] art. 332 (1999), as amended 2015,
http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=1013921 [https://perma.cc/Z4XC-JMNZ].
193. Interview with Attorney 24, in Astana, Kaz. (Dec. 2015).
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disputed property, which for particularly well-located properties, can result 
in a substantial sum.194  Many individual landholders interviewed inherited 
their property or purchased it before huge increases in land value.  This is 
especially true in Astana, where the transfer of the capital there has led to an 
enormous upswing in land values.  Nevertheless, such individuals tend to be 
comprised of lower-income, working families, or pensioners who are hard-
pressed to pay fees for an attorney. They are also less likely to have personal 
ties with someone in the akimat or courts who can advocate informally on 
their behalf.  They are, in other words, easy targets.  It is therefore not 
surprising that land insecurity appears greater for these already-vulnerable 
individuals.195
The conditions attached to different land categorizations further lower 
the cost for officials.  As cities have expanded, permanent dwellings have 
often been built on land designated for “dachas (summer cottage) or garden 
use.”196 Permanent residence on such land is outside the legal use of land in 
that designation,197 and as outlined previously, transferring land to another 
categorization poses significant political and economic hurdles.  If officials 
seize land belonging to individuals who own or lease dacha/garden land, they 
then pay a much lower price.198 Not only is the market price lower, but also 
the building’s value is miscalculated as the price will only reflect the value of 
its material composition (i.e., lumber, cement).199  This land can then be 
resold or re-leased after its designation has been changed––authority which 
conveniently also lies with the akimat.200
One recent case in Astana involved several poor families who had their 
homes and land seized by the state.  Although they pressed their case as far 
as the Supreme Court, they ultimately lost.201 Official correspondence cited 
the fact that they were (contrary to the law) illegally residing full-time on land 
designated for another purpose.202 Land designated for dachas and gardening 
cannot be used for permanent habitation, which makes it much cheaper.203
Many individuals relocating to major cities bought this land because it was 
the only affordable option and turned it into their year-round homes,204 but in 
doing so, they broke the law, and thus became vulnerable to seizure for 
improper use in addition to state needs.  In this case, reporters found that 
(contrary to the cited reasons for the seizure) new developments had sprung 
194. Id.
195. Ethnographic Notes, Courts, in Astana, Kaz. (Oct.–Nov. 2015). 
196. Id. (emphasis added).
197. Land Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, supra note 33, art. 3; Akimat of the 
City of Astana, Department of Internal Policy of the City of Astana, Letter K-387-3T (Aug. 
11, 2014) (on file with author).
198. Ethnographic Notes, Courts, in Astana, Kaz. (Oct.–Nov. 2015).
199. Interview with Attorney 6, in Astana, Kaz. (Mar. 2015).
200. Land Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, supra note 33, art. 3.
201. Akimat of the City of Astana, supra note 197.
202. Id.
203. Interview with Appraiser 2, in Astana, Kaz. (May 2015). 
204. Interview with Journalist (Sept. 25, 2015).
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up in that location instead.205 They cited informal pressure from the capital’s 
akim to rule against the dispossessed landowners; that personal influence 
interacted with the formal authority vested in that office (for transferring 
categorization of land, initiating seizures) to create severe land insecurity for 
poor families.206 Even though the ultimate reason for seizure had been 
falsified, the families had been residing illegally, and those officials 
responsible for enforcing occupancy laws belonged to the akimat
administration, which initiated the seizure for state needs in the first place.207
Threatening land security among vulnerable populations like these is, 
consequently, low-cost but high-gain for local officials.
Though these threats emerge and are settled at the local level, they are 
informed by centrally imposed laws and courts.  Courts strive to protect the 
central budget, but where that prerogative does not conflict with local 
officials’ actions, local officials’ rights are prioritized over citizens’ rights to 
a point.  As addressed in the next section, there also exists a lower bound on 
officials’ actions that courts consistently enforce.  Thus, threats to property 
rights emerge from interactions between informal power structures and 
formal rules at differing levels of official state authority.  Formal legislation 
creates guidelines and “tools” for local officials that balance their rent-
seeking with the need to prevent these practices from draining the central 
budget.  This results in vulnerable, low-resource individuals being targeted 
for expropriation.  In particular, central mandates to limit compensation paid 
for seizures have shifted the burden of this insecurity from the central budget 
to individual citizens.  Corruption has become “legal” and acceptable for the 
regime, but at the cost of further marginalization of already-vulnerable 
segments of the population.
VII. How Law Matters
This section returns directly to the driving question of the paper: how do 
law and courts matter for property rights security?  We see this most clearly 
when it comes to the issue of compensation for state expropriation of private 
property.  The introduction of the law on state property shows that this rent-
seeking must occur in a way that does not run counter to central authorities’ 
interests, namely, their interest in not draining the central budget.  That law 
introduced a clear mandate—backed by the president’s informal authority as 
key patron—for how land-related rent-seeking should not occur.208 Multiple 
sources involved in its creation stated that the law was developed in response 
to local akims’ collaboration with otsenschiki (land appraisers) to inflate 
prices for land seized for state needs, specifically, the construction of a major, 
international transit corridor crossing Kazakhstan's southern regions.209 Land 
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Akimat of the City of Astana, supra note 197.
208. Interview with Appraiser 7, in Almaty, Kaz. (Dec. 2015); Interviews with 
Attorneys 9 and 13, in Shymkent, Kaz. (Apr. 2015).
209. Interview with Appraiser 7, in Almaty, Kaz. (Dec. 2015); Interviews with 
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appraisal at market value takes into account numerous factors and legally, can 
rest on three different accepted methodologies.210 The combination of 
multiple methodologies—a relatively low level of professional training 
among many appraisers, errors, and room for subjective judgment—means 
that appraisals may differ significantly for the same land plot.211 If local 
officials collaborate with or pressure appraisers, those values take on a 
particularly subjective and suspect hue.  A report on the appraisals conducted 
for the transportation project found that most exhibit gross errors, with 
instances of low-value land being appraised at $6,000 per sotok (1/100 
hectare).212 Funds for the transportation project came directly from the 
central budget.  When the money for the highway vanished and there was 
little to show for it beyond empty steppe, authorities demanded an 
investigation and quickly introduced the “Law of Frightened Bureaucrats.”213
Because Kazakhstan does not use common law (and has abolished its 
Constitutional Court), judges can pick and choose statutes that provide 
officials with favorable terms while still remaining within the law.  In court, 
attorneys and individuals often raise the argument that land appraisers’ 
calculation of compensation under point 2, article 67 of the Law on State 
Property violates Article 26 of the Constitution, which guarantees “equivalent 
compensation” in cases of expropriation for public use.214  A judge advised 
against using this legal tactic in a case where neighbors with identical 
property received significantly different compensation.  The Supreme Court 
had previously issued guidance that compensation was to be calculated in 
accordance with the Law on State Property, and “it was better to take the 
money and leave.”215 The attorney had raised the example of a nearly 
identical land plot located in the same neighborhood as the one in question:
Attorney for landholder: They appraised it well, yes? 135,000,000 tenge.
Attorney for akimat: Well, that's the expert’s appraisal.
Attorney for landholder: I heard that they have a sister in the akimat.
Attorney for akimat: Maybe the plot is somehow different? It’s not on [Street 
Name]?
Attorney for landholder: No, it’s exactly there.216
Attorneys 9 and 13, in Shymkent, Kaz. (Apr. 2015).
210. Standardt Otsenki, Otsenka Stoimosti Nedvizhimogo Imuschestva 
[Standard Assessment, Evaluation Value of Real Property] (2013), http://kazprice.com/
standart-otsenki-otsenka-stoimosti-nedvizhimogo-imushchestva [https://perma.cc/5UL3-
JZHY].
211. Interviews with Appraisers 1–5, in Astana, Kaz. (May 2015).
212. SPRAVKA, supra note 145.
213. V. Pokusov, V srede otsenschikov etot dokument nazyvaut zakonom ispugannykh 
chinovnikov, [Among Appraisers, This Document is Called the Law of Frightened 
Bureaucrats], INTERFAX (2015), https://www.interfax.kz/?lang=rus&int_id=quotings_
of_the_day&news_id=5215 [https://perma.cc/2GQZ-JX88].
214. See Law on State Property, supra note 69; Ryskalievich, supra note 76.
215. Ethnographic Notes, Courts, in Astana, Kaz. (Dec. 2015).
216. Id. 
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Neighbors of the landholder refuted the claim that the neighboring plots were 
“different enough” to warrant vastly different appraisals.217 A physical 
inspection of the neighborhood provided no obvious reason to doubt the 
neighbors.  The land plots under seizure appeared largely identical in location, 
home size, and other key factors.218 Yet, the neighbor reportedly received the 
equivalent of close to $500,000 in compensation, while the individual in the 
courtroom that day received less than a quarter of that amount (26,000,000 
tenge).219 This difference stemmed from distinct ways that legal and informal 
logics were combined.  In the latter case, the landowner’s lack of informal 
connections meant that the judge followed the least-favorable legal 
interpretation, thereby protecting the interests of local officials and the central 
government.  In the former, informal links to the local government led to the 
application of the more favorable laws governing compensation.
The above example suggests that barring some informal, personal 
connection that can be translated into “telephone justice” (or, perhaps, the 
ability to bribe the judge), individuals will always lose in court battles against 
local officials who violate their property rights.  Certainly, only in highly 
exceptional cases will they manage to keep their property, and they are 
unlikely to receive a fair market value for their land.  This results in acute 
property insecurity, because most who lack connections or wealth already 
exist in a precarious financial position and without land and housing, they 
become further marginalized.  Most times, the sums offered are insufficient 
to buy anything remotely equivalent in an urban area.  High land prices and 
rents in the city mean that families are forced to either move into far smaller 
dwellings—from an entire house into single-room dwellings, often without 
any bathroom or kitchen appliances (and no funds left to purchase those)—
or to villages far removed from their current jobs and schools.220 As one 
landholder decried in court, “[t]his isn’t equivalent housing (as specified in 
the Constitution and Land Code)—we’re going from better to worse 
conditions. We’ll be on the street.”221 All this suggests that local officials 
always win.  This, however, does not mean that law sets no bounds on how 
they do so.
Judges consistently emphasize the need—once a ruling is made—for the 
akimat to immediately release funds to those individuals whose land have 
been seized.222 Attorneys confirmed that in cases between state officials and 
citizens, court decisions were reliably and quickly enforced: “it goes [and 
they’re fulfilled] sufficiently well if they’re state cases—if they’re private, 
sometimes it’s difficult (slozhnui).”223 Moreover, in court cases where local 
officials had failed to compensate landholders at all, such as the seizure of the 
217. Id. 
218. Author’s Observation and Field Notes (Dec. 2015). 
219. Ethnographic Notes, Courts, in Astana, Kaz. (Dec. 2015).
220. Interview 1 with Attorney 23, in Astana, Kaz. (Oct. 2015); Interviews with 
Landholders 4–6 and 9, in Astana, Kaz. (Sept.–Oct. 2015).
221. Ethnographic Notes, Courts, in Astana, Kaz. (Nov. 2015).
222. Ethnographic Notes, Courts, in Astana, Kaz. (Nov.–Dec. 2015).
223. Interview with Attorney 24, in Astana, Kaz. (Dec. 2015).
39262-cin_50-1 Sheet No. 26 Side B      07/06/2017   10:17:34
39262-cin_50-1 Sheet No. 26 Side B      07/06/2017   10:17:34
C M
Y K
HANSON FORMATTED (4-7-17) 6/28/2017 4:31 PM
44 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 50
garage and property in Astana discussed at the beginning of this paper, judges 
did rule against the akimat.224 In the aforementioned case, the judge chastised 
the akimat’s representative and threatened to have the prosecutor bring an 
administrative suit for failure to follow the law and provide compensation.225
These cases were fewer than the disputes over the amount of compensation 
offered, but again, courts stressed payment (granted, not the payment that any 
of the landholders sought) for the land within the period specified by the 
law.226 In a few cases, the judge marginally increased the amount of 
compensation provided, but did not stray far from the compensation offered 
by the akimat: “the difference [in what the landholders requested] was nearly 
KTZ 20,000,000 tenge (about U.S. $70,000 at then-current exchange rates) 
different from that which the state evaluated—I can’t offer them that much 
more than what was originally offered.”227
In other words, this minimal, legally-stipulated compensation constitutes 
a bound for local officials.  Should they seek to circumvent it and avoid 
paying any compensation to landholders, they risk censure by courts.  In fact, 
the very need to speak of circumvention indicates that the law affects their 
behavior.  At the same time, the bounds set by central authorities on 
compensation provide local officials with strong incentives to target 
vulnerable individuals.  Poorer, less-connected landholders are less likely to 
have informal networks that could change their or judges’ calculus for 
compensation.  Therefore, these landholders represent more attractive targets 
for seizure and rent-seeking.  Rent-seeking in these instances is low cost, 
because it involves minimal payment and lower likelihood of formal, time-
consuming challenges in court, or of potentially problematic issues involving 
informal ties.  Those officials who fail to meet the minimum conditions for 
centrally-permitted rent-seeking—or who overstep their bounds in the other 
direction, by pocketing too much from the central budget or by taking from 
those with strong informal networks—increase their personal risk in what is 
otherwise a low-risk, legal rent-seeking enterprise.
VIII. Legal Pluralism
Legal pluralism in property law, like the continued coexistence of the 
Law on State Property and Land Code examined in this Article and the “room 
for maneuvering” built into laws on appraisal and seizure, provide intentional 
space for multiple logics.  In doing so, it usually propagates insecurity, but 
allows space for more secure property rights for some.  Where individuals 
can draw on personal ties to buttress their property claims, more favorable 
legal statutes suddenly become paramount; where they cannot, officials and 
courts uphold the rights of the state and its agents to the detriment of ordinary 
citizens.  This dynamic logic in the application of law more broadly reflects 
the politics which underlie social relations in Kazakhstan.  Hale refers to this 
224. Ethnographic Notes, Courts, in Astana, Kaz. (Oct.–Nov. 2015).
225. Id. 
226. Ethnographic Notes, Courts, in Astana, Kaz. (Nov.–Dec. 2015).
227. Ethnographic Notes, Courts, in Astana, Kaz. (Nov. 2015).
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as patronalism, which “refers to a social equilibrium in which individuals 
organize their political and economic pursuits primarily around the 
personalized exchange of concrete rewards and punishments.”228 As a 
consequence of these politics, property relations do not involve a single, 
linear reasoning, but rather shift depending on underlying informal 
conditions.  This is not the same as claims that formal legislation does not 
matter; if that were the case, we would see a much more diverse range of 
outcomes.  Instead, law and informal logic combine in patterned yet dynamic 
ways to shape how threats to property occur, and to whom.  By the same 
virtue, they shape whose property is secure; those landowners with close
personal ties to local officials enjoy the upper bounds of what the law has to 
offer—not only through compensation, but even by receiving protection 
against seizure itself.
Perhaps the most obvious evidence of this phenomenon is the continued 
existence of the small Chubary Raion, a neighborhood in the heart of Astana's 
“new” city (as opposed to the older, colonial and Soviet era center). The 
neighborhood features numerous large, expensive residences, which also 
happen to be where many very high-ranking officials, including the current 
head of the presidential administration, live.229 A new roadway has been 
planned that would require destroying a number of these homes, but there 
“were not [sufficient] financial resources” for the project to move forward in 
2012.230 To date, no land has been seized, and no roadway built.  By contrast, 
just a few kilometers away in the neighborhood discussed above, a similar 
road expansion project has already begun.231  The market rate there is—
despite also being quite high—not an issue. There, most residents lack the 
informal ties needed to ensure the most favorable legal configuration.
Conclusions
Do law and courts—contrary to most expectations regarding 
authoritarian regimes—matter for property rights security in Kazakhstan?  In
short, yes; however, they do not necessarily do so in a way that upholds 
broader conceptions of rule of law.  Law matters because it communicates the 
central governments’ bounds for local officials.  Land-related legislation 
concentrates enormous authority in akims.  In doing so, it protects their ability 
to seek rents and reward their own networks, while legitimating those actions 
228. HALE, supra note 186, at 20.
229. Personal Correspondence, in Astana, Kaz. (May, 2011); Natalie R. Koch, The City 
and the Steppe: Territory, Technologies of Government, and Kazakhstan’s New Capital 
146 (May 16, 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado), 
http://nataliekoch.com/docs/Koch_2012_Dissertation.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6KN-
KYBE].
230. A. Usupova, Chastichnyj snos mikrorajona “Chubary” v Astane obojdetsa 
primerno v 20 millionov dollarov [Partial Demolition of the Neighborhood “Chubary”
Cost About $20 Million in Astana], TENGRI NEWS (Apr. 3, 2012, 4:25 PM), 
http://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/chastichnyiy-snos-mikrorayona-chubaryi-astane-
oboydetsya-211405 [https://perma.cc/TZS9-SG7F].
231. Interview 1 with Attorney 23, in Astana, Kaz. (Oct. 2015); Interviews with 
Landholders 4–6 and 9, in Astana, Kaz. (Sept.–Oct. 2015).
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in terms of fulfilling public needs, such as improved infrastructure or 
educational facilities; it is difficult to garner broad public resistance to 
building schools or roads needed for rapidly-expanding urban areas.  Local 
officials’ continued ability to line their own pockets using regime-sanctioned 
actions helps sustain the vertical pyramid of patron-client relations on which 
Kazakhstani politics (and those in many authoritarian regimes) are based.  As 
Hale notes, these behaviors are “not simply a tumor on the body politic, 
something that can be isolated and excised.  Instead, they are more like the 
body’s lifeblood.”232
At the same time, law guides how this “institutionalized rent-seeking” 
may occur by setting effective upper and lower bounds for acceptable 
behavior.  Rather than insecurity derived from violations of the law (legal 
insecurity), it is embedded within the law itself (allocation insecurity).  
Courts, as faithful agents of the executive, ensure that local officials remain 
within the boundaries set by law.  In doing so, there are multiple logics at 
play: a legal logic, which rests on a hierarchy of laws; and an informal logic 
predicated on personal connections to state officials and, to a lesser extent, on 
wealth (the two are often linked and thus difficult to separate).  Each logic 
constitutes a strategic resource, and how individuals combine them 
determines whether they get the upper or lower bounds of the law—but law 
still forms bounds.
In short, laws governing land rights in Kazakhstan reflect the informal 
principles which underlie the regime, but in a dynamic, interactive 
relationship, those laws also influence informal activities like local officials’ 
rent-seeking.  Law shapes how threats to property occur by providing a signal 
from central to local officials charged with the day-to-day interpretation of 
property rights about the kinds of behavior that will be tolerated.  Judges are 
agents who act to ensure that rent-seeking occurs within the bounds of the 
law.  They do so not only by adjudicating between these legal and informal 
logics, but also by providing an opportunity for limited redress to individual 
citizens whose property has been threatened in ways that violate the lowest 
limits of the law.  Consequently, we see minimal rights for most, and far 
stronger, more robust property rights security for a select few.  This implies 
economic growth that further exacerbates inequality, and in a rapidly-
developing country, a modernization project that benefits some while 
excluding most.
232. HALE, supra note 186, at 19.
